At the core of Habermas’ philosophy is the theory of communicative action. One can say that almost the entire structure of his philosophy rests upon that theoretical foundation. As Dietz and Widdershoven say in “Speech Acts or Communicative Action?”
“Central to Habermas’ philosophy is the distinction between strategic and communicative action. When involved in strategic action, the participants strive after their own private goals. In doing so they may either compete or cooperate, depending on whether their goals oppose each other or rather coincide. When they cooperate, they only are motivated empirically to do so: they try to maximize their own profit or minimize their own losses. When involved in communicative action, the participants are oriented towards mutual agreement. The motivation for cooperation therefore is not empirical but rational: people respond e.g. to requests because they presuppose that these requests can be justified. The basic condition for communicative action is that the participants achieve a common definition of the situation in which they find themselves. This consensus is reached by negotiations about the validity claims raised (Habermas, 1981, I, p.25 ff).” Not all communication is teleological or purposive (strategic), communication may also be directed towards “mutual agreement”. The book “Communication, Intention and Reality” rejects Habermas’ claim and shows that all communication is purposive, arguing that “mutual agreement” can contain a strategic component. Such an argument undercuts the entire structure of Habermas’ philosophy and brings into question its integrity.
The philosophy of Darryl Naranjit 