- Ideology, Pragmatism and Ethno-Opportunism
Ferguson has claimed that Jagan displayed an “essential ‘innocence’” that was responsible for much of his political problems with the United States and the United Kingdom, while Burnham “displayed a clear-headed grasp of the realpolitik of his environment” (Ferguson 1999, xi, xii). In this regard the conflict between political pragmatism and ideological purity needs to be examined. Certainly in the heady days of the 1960’s, when the Third World was aflame with independence and liberation movements, political idealism was not unusual. But the argument holds that Jagan was perhaps carried away by the revolutionary geist and rhetoric of the age.
Ferguson states:
The Burnham-Jagan nationalist coalition of forces in the early 1950’s for a brief moment galvanised the Guyanese people and inspired hope for a unity of purpose in nation-building. But this short-lived unity of the nationalist forces across class and race was irretrievably ruptured and has left in its wake the political debris – including recriminations, attribution of blame, deep personal enmities and the like – for a persisting and intractable alienation of the two major racial groups in Guyana. Stoking the embers of the emergent racial alienation at the time were exceedingly powerful external interests that unabashedly exploited this crucial political divergence in pursuit of their own geo-strategic imperatives, linked to the Cold War.
In this connection, Jagan and the PPP provided the two major and relevant Western powers of the period, the US and the UK, with a ready-made reason for their divisive interventionism. In the harsh Cold war context of the moment, the Soviet-oriented communist sympathies of the PPP’s top leadership were objectionable to them from their strategic vantage-point of the life-and-death struggle with the Soviet Union. This was the basic stuff of realpolitik, conceived as external policy and behaviour linked closely to power and national interests and divorced from considerations of morality and principle. Within the framework of the prevailing global ideological contestation for supremacy, the fate of Jagan and the PPP was effectively sealed. (Ferguson 1999, xi)
The question arises – when does pragmatism dissolve into opportunism? What are the limits of pragmatism and ideological purity? For small, militarily non-powerful, Caribbean states, the question is critical. The PNM’s post-1991 championing of the private sector as the engine of growth, Manley’s conversion to the doctrine of the private sector as the engine of growth, Jagan’s acceptance of the same doctrine, all of this points to the vulnerability of Caribbean states in the American Lake and the success of the “ideological offensive” of neo-liberalism (or neo-conservatism) in the post Cold War age. How is the limit of resistance to the curtailment of autonomy in the region to be gauged? For certainly Ferguson’s comments do not advocate a purely rubber-stamp role to Caribbean governments. They raise a critically important and legitimate issue, particularly in light of the fact that governments in the region, including Guyana, have embraced the doctrine of market led reforms anyhow. The PPP no longer advocates a Marxist state; its policies are avowedly market oriented.
If the question of pragmatism and ideological purity is one way of assessing the history of Guyana from the 1960’s, Ralph Premdas’ study introduces another perspective. For Premdas the history of Guyana since that split in the PPP produced two ethnically based parties, competing in a struggle to the death for dominance. The moment of reconciliation was irretrievable lost. According to Premdas:
The moment of opportunity to build a new basis for inter-group relations and a new society was lost forever it seemed, when the two sectional leaders parted company, formed their own parties and pursued their own ambitions for personal acclaim and power. The moment of reconciliation is a rare event in a multi-ethnic state suffused with all sorts of underlying predispositions for ethnically-inspired behaviour. What makes the loss of that opportune moment even more unbearable is the following sequence of events in which the old divisions embedded in the social structure were exploited and exacerbated by a new form of mass politics. A new type of party emerged, constructed on the discrete ethnic fragments into which the old unified party had been broken. (Premdas 1995, 45)
One may ask – what caused this moment of opportunity to be squandered? If the events leading up to the split in the PPP are analyzed, it is clear that pressure was brought to bear on the publicly proclaimed Marxist PPP by both the United States and the United Kingdom. As Ferguson writes – “The British had their clear strategic concerns in Guyana. Apart from safeguarding their colonial economic interests, a major concern, echoing that of the Americans, had to do with ensuring that Guyana was not ruled by a communist government, closely aligned with the hostile Soviet Union… the Guyana debacle of the early 1960’s was unfolding in the context of the Cold war at its height…” (Ferguson 1999, xii, xiii).
Maurice St. Pierre describes the events after the election of the PPP in 1953 (St. Pierre, 1999, 103-128). British troops were sent to British Guiana in October of 1953 to prevent “Communist subversion of the Government”. A number of PPP government ministers were detained. Tensions between PPP supporters and the colonial administration under Governor Savage escalated. (For a description of these events, see: St. Pierre 1999, 103-128; Jagan 1997, 123-146; Burnham 1970, xix) The constant pressure brought to bear on the PPP exacerbated the fault line between ‘moderates’ and ‘Marxists’. Finally in February 1955 a motion of no-confidence in the executive was moved by the Burnham faction. It was clear that the British government was sending a message that Burnham was a more acceptable leader than Jagan, and that message was having an impact on Burnham and his supporters.
The motion of no-confidence led to a walk-out by the Jaganite faction. At this point a new executive was voted in and Burnham was chosen as leader of the party. The Jaganite faction reacted to this by expelling Burnham and some of his main followers – Jai Narine Singh, and Dr. J.B. Latchmansingh – and disciplining other supporters of Burnham (St. Pierre 1999, 135). Eventually the party split into two factions, one headed by Jagan, the other by Burnham. The pressure put on the party and on the society as a whole by the events following the elections of 1953 and the election of a publicly declared Marxist PPP government was the trigger that fractured the party and the society.
Premdas writes about “triggers” that precipitate ethnic conflict. He claims:
The factors that triggered ethnic conflict were clearly identifiable but occurred at different times during the evolution of the problem. These factors were: (1) colonial manipulation; (2) introduction of mass democratic politics; and (3) rivalry over resource allocation. It is necessary to cumulatively conceive of the problem in which these factors at different points served as precipitating ‘triggers’. At various times, a particular triggering factor deposited a layer of division which in turn provided the next step for the deposit of a new layer of forces to the accumulating crisis. (Premdas 1995, 185).
The pressure put on the government and the society after the 1953 elections by the colonial powers were indeed a form of “colonial manipulation” designed to prevent what these powers conceived to be a “communist subversion”. There is no doubt that the geo-politics of the era was the deciding factor in that intervention. As Ferguson says, “In the harsh Cold war context of the moment, the Soviet-oriented communist sympathies of the PPP’s top leadership were objectionable to them from their strategic vantage-point of the life-and-death struggle with the Soviet Union” (Ferguson, 1999, xi).
The issue becomes then – how do Caribbean governments draw that line between pragmatism and ideology? How do Caribbean governments represent the interests of the masses who elect them in the face of the possibly opposing interests of hegemonic powers? Again the construction of a political language, which allows maneuverability by governments in the region, seems vitally important. Certainly, without that common political language, the distinction between “pragmatism” and “opportunism” is a difficult one to make. Such a distinction can be made only by reference to the actual political outcome of the various political actors time in office, i.e. their deeds.
The philosophy of Darryl Naranjit 