Tag: guyana

Guyana: Ideological Opportunism

  1. The IMF/World Bank Intervention into Guyana

Guyana has had a long and fitful relationship with the IMF and World Bank. In the 1960s, Guyana was hard pressed to obtain foreign aid. Jagan wrote, “Actually, US foreign aid has dropped from US$3.5 billion during the Kennedy period to $1.4 billion in 1969” (Jagan 1968). Aid had been used historically in an attempt to shape the politics of Guyana. In fact aid was used both as a carrot and a stick in an attempt to defang Marxist economics. In the late 1970’s when Burnham was under threat by the WPF, aid was forthcoming in the form of an IMF loan. According to Premdas:

Significantly, the year 1978 was also the year when the Guyana (sic) received a significant loan from the International Monetary Fund. Changes in the U.S.-Guyana relations became identifiable when the U.S. extended a sum of US $24.7 million to Guyana in 1978. In the same year, the IMF agreed to provide the PNC government with a standby loan of US$135 million…From practically losing all U.S. aid by 1975, Guyana, according to U.S. Ambassador George Roberts, was receiving the highest per capita aid from the United States during 1978-1979…The Washington Post noted that the sudden massive aid to the Burnham regime as of 1978-1979 onwards, was part of ‘U.S. efforts to check the spread of leftist influences in the Caribbean’ (Premdas 1995, 131-132).

By the 1980s, however, with the advent of the Reagan administration in the United States, a new philosophy guided the distribution of foreign aid. The Washington Consensus tied aid to the implementation of Structural Adjustment policies. These adjustment policies began in the early 1980s under Burnham and necessitated a reduction in the size of the Public Sector, something that affected supporters of the PNC more than those of the PPP. Burnham led a campaign against the IMF because of the layoffs in the Public Sector and by 1985 Guyana became the first country to be refused access to IMF funds (Ferguson 1995, 54-55). With the death of Burnham in 1985 and the accession of Desmond Hoyte to the Presidency, a new era in relations between Guyana and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) began. Tyrone Ferguson gives a comprehensive account of the effect of Structural Adjustment (SA) on Guyana. He makes clear the connection between Structural Adjustment and Good Governance under the Hoyte administration.

According to Ferguson, Hoyte was open to instituting economic reform to the socialist model that Burnham had established. “The new administration began in 1986 in unmistakable terms to define a different vision of political economy by articulating its commitment to a project of market-oriented development and the imperative of normalizing relations with the Western financial community” (Ferguson 1995, 56). Ferguson also points to the association of Structural Adjustment with good governance and the impact of its requirements on the politics. Ferguson writes, “a fundamental element of good governance is the implantation of political democratization in those adjusting countries which are, in fact, distinguished by the absence of a tradition of competitive electoral politics, perceived and deemed to be free and fair by domestic participants in, and external observers of, the process” (Ferguson 1995, 204).The requirement for free and fair elections was held out to the opposition PPP as an incentive so that they would become part of the Adjustment process. The opposition forces and the unions had opposed the implementation of SA. The opposition, feeling that the PNC was continuing Burnham’s opportunistic policies, was distrustful of Hoyte’s intentions. SA loans seemed to be just another lifeline thrown out to the PNC to perpetuate their rule. The idea of good governance, however, held out some promise. SA Loans were tied to free and fair elections. Ifill states:

From the early months in 1990, a large number of external actors (both governmental and nongovernmental) brought their individual and combined influence and pressure to bear on the Hoyte regime to force extensive electoral reform. They all publicly and unmistakably alluded to the connection between SAP and electoral democracy. The most significant and influential pressures emanated from the US authorities and culminated in the US government’s decision to discontinue financial support to the ERP in 1991, and the clear association between its resumption and conducting free and fair elections. The British and Canadian governments followed suit, linking potential aid to the holding of free and fair elections. (Ifill 2002)

Not only were SA loans dependent on free and fair elections, the opposition PPP, in order to gain the benefit of free and fair elections, had to accept the free market, SA assumptions. Ifill claims, “It is important to note that explicit support from major Western donor, in particular the US, did not occur until there were explicit statements from the political opposition, in particular Cheddi Jagan, indicating that he had moved away from his radical leftist, anti-capitalist stance and had accepted the principle of laissez-faire in economic affairs” (Ifill 2002).

Jagan was accused by the PNC of pursuing “Machiavellian politics”. Jagan himself said that he had moved away from leftist politics and had accepted free market principles. In an interview with Fred Rosen and Mario Murillo, Jagan said “Let me just say that socialism is not on the agenda in Guyana. We can speak of a period of national democracy” (Jagan 1997, NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 31:1.  Copyright 1997 by the North American Congress on Latin America). In that interview, he appeared to be saying that his Marxism was a product of the historical circumstances of Guyana, and that one should not be ideological when it comes to economic policy, but do what is best for the country, a philosophy that seems remarkably close to pragmatism. In all fairness to Jagan, at that point he could do little to oppose the IMF/World Bank policies considering the economic crisis that faced Guyana. In this sense Jagan’s turn towards free market economics resembles Michael Manley’s similar conversion.

Ferguson outlines the effect of Structural Adjustment on the exchange rate, fiscal policy, monetary policy and public sector reform among other things and he analyses the consequences on various sections of the populations. There were winners and losers in the post Adjustment Guyana. According to Ferguson, in writing about the IMF-EFF agreement in 1980 and the World Bank SAL programme of 1981 – “These two programmes gave a stronger focus to the supply-side of the economy, but within an ideological context that was concerned to reverse the existing situation of a dominant public sector in economic activities” (Ferguson 1999, 359). The consequences of rolling back the state’s activity in the economic domain “…presented the PNC government with a major dilemma” (Ferguson 1999, 360). It would be beneficial mostly to those opposed to the PNC government. Ferguson makes these observations –

The main losers from any such programme could only be the PNC’s core political support – the urban-based African group which, when sugar was taken out of the equation, provided the bulk of public sector employees… Importantly, also, private sector led growth had another significant implication of prime political import. Its beneficiaries would come primarily from ethnic groups opposed to the PNC government and more directly the East Indian group that was basically aligned with its main political opponent, the PPP. (Ferguson 1999, 360-361).

Ferguson’s observations can be brought into sharper focus – those who benefited in the society by privatization and liberalization were private sector elites, many of them being East Indian, along with Chinese and white businessmen – the latter being the very sector that both PNC and PPP had initially fought against. The political history of Guyana can be recounted as: the domination by elites, the struggle against this domination and the eventual return to precisely that domination by business elites (albeit now expanded ethnically to include numerous East Indians). The ideological change of direction can be taken, from one interpretation, to be an indication of the failure of socialism and nationalism to engender economic well being (or as Manley had put it – to bring about growth), and its replacement by free market principles. However, this study argues that a more accurate interpretation may be that the private sector led liberalization policies promoted by the IMF/World Bank have been ideologically based, and underpinned with a political agenda – the re-colonization of the Third World.  

Apart from emasculating the state and benefiting business elites, has this ideologically driven free market reform (as opposed to pragmatic reform) been beneficial to Caribbean people as a whole? Certainly in Guyana some have prospered, however, many have not. In 1993 statistics, the income of the lowest 40% of the population was 17% of the total income of Guyana; the income of the highest 10% was 32% of the Guyanese national income (2000 World Development Indicators). The gap between rich and poor is significant and increasing. The same holds for Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The elites have certainly benefitted. The middle classes are disappearing. The poor sink into deeper poverty. The cycle of ethno-politicization in Guyana continues with new winners and new losers. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose – one might be tempted to say.

Guyana: Ideological Opportunism

  1. Burnham and the PNC years

Elections were again held in British Guiana in 1957. Jagan’s PPP won nine seats, Burnham’s PPP won three seats, other minor parties, the NLF and the UDP (United Democratic Party) won one seat each. The Jaganite PPP became the government and Jagan became the Minister of Trade and Industry. After the elections of 1957, the ethnic divide hardened. The Burnhamite PPP merged with the conservative UDP to form the PNC (People’s National Congress). The question can be asked – was the split engendered by racism or ideology? According to Garner, “The initial phase of ethnopoliticization in British Guiana was completed in 1956 by the splitting of the nationalist movement (at every level) into two opposing camps within which, one or the other of the two largest ethnic groups were dominant” (Garner 2008, 107). If the distinction between ‘Marxist’ Jagan and ‘socialist’ or ‘moderate’ Burnham is allowed then a case can be made that ideology was indeed a factor. However, if Burnham’s later policies were taken into account, then it is clear than the distinction between Marxist Jagan and socialist Burnham can not hold. Opportunism, in the face of British and American opposition to Cheddi Jagan’s avowed Marxism, would seem to be a more accurate explanation of Burnham’s moderation.

Burnham could be seen, from one perspective, not as a principled socialist or Marxist, but as an opportunistic politician who was not ideologically committed to a particular position but who would adopt whatever political posture that suited his political objectives. The argument could be made, however, that Burnham’s public postures should be assessed as strategic posturing. Hence the idea that Jagan was politically naïve, while Burnham was more ‘politically intelligent’ has been advanced as an explanation. Ethno-opportunism, however, if defined as a community colluding with foreign interests in pursuit of political power, seems to be a more viable explanation in the light of the distinction between word and deed. Ethno-opportunism, however, has its downside. It means that collusion with foreign interests results in a competition for approval from the colonial powers and as the PNC was to discover later – two can play at that game, particularly when the financial persuasion of the IMF/World Bank ‘Washington Consensus’ became utilized.

In the 1961 elections, there were a number of political parties competing, among them were Jagan’s PPP, Burnham’s PNC and Portuguese businessman Peter D’Aguiar’s UF (United Force).The PPP won with 20 seats, the PNC won 11 and the conservative UF won 4 seats. The period after the 1961 elections was characterized by destabilization and violence. An account of that period posted by the US Department of State on the relations between Washington and Jagan and Burnham states:

Jagan believed with good reason that Washington’s opposition was one of his main problems. While these diplomatic efforts were underway, the U.S. Government acted on a covert political plan to defeat Jagan by funneling secret financial support, campaign advice and expertise, and other assistance to the two main opposition parties, Linden Forbes Burnham’s People’s National Congress (PNC) and Peter D’Aguiar’s United Front (UF). (370) Realizing that Burnham, as the leading Afro-Guyanese politician, was Jagan’s most able and by far his most popular opponent, the U.S. Government focused its efforts on him and the PNC. (391, 414) The U.S. Government supplied anti-Jagan films and publications, cut almost all aid to British Guiana, and refused all of Jagan’s overtures for high-level meetings with U.S. officials, hoping to undercut his prestige. (US Department of State, 2005)

After the 1961 elections, the PPP introduced its austerity budget of 1962. This budget advocated a regime of progressive taxation, and a compulsory savings scheme on salaries above G$100 per month. Trade unions antagonistic to the PPP, and as St. Pierre and Garner have claimed, influenced by American trade unions (the AFL-CIO), agitated against the budget (St. Pierre 1999, Garner 2008, 139). St. Pierre writes, “Thus by February 1962, when rioting broke out, American trade union influence was well established” (St. Pierre 1999, 148). The 1962 riots escalated and ethnic violence broke out in many areas. The question uppermost in the minds of British and American officials was how to deal with this jostle for power between ‘communist’ Jagan and ‘socialist’ Burnham and their respective ethnic communal supporters. Jagan, it must be remembered, had been democratically elected in 1953, 1957 and 1961.

There was one school of thought that envisioned weaning Jagan from his communist ways; that Jagan was not a committed communist although there were close associates who were ideologically so defined (Garner 2008, St. Pierre 1999). Another school of thought viewed Jagan as an unrepentant communist who would be another Castro in the Caribbean and who therefore had to be rendered politically impotent. Both Maurice St. Pierre and Steve Garner have detailed the intervention of Britain and America into the politics of British Guiana, and their attempts to keep Jagan out of power, seeing him as representative of that communist threat and another Fidel Castro. Suffice to say, Proportional Representation (PR) was imposed on the country as the best means of keeping Jagan from winning the elections. PR was implemented in British Guiana before the 1964 elections. “On 2 October 1963, COLOFF official R.W. Piper called in an American Embassy Officer to explain that, in an effort to solve the BG constitutional problem, HMG would probably convene a conference on 22 October, during which time Sandys would state that HMG was ‘imposing’ a solution involving a new electoral system based on proportional representation”  (St. Pierre 1999, 187).

There were three major parties involved in the 1964 elections held under the new PR format: the PPP, the PNC and the United Force (UF). The results showed that the PPP won 24 seats with 45.8% of the votes, the PNC won 22 with 40.5% of the votes, and the UF won 7 with 12.4 % of the votes. The 1964 elections were conducted under a State of Emergency which continued until December 1966. Since none of the parties had more than 50% of the votes, the PNC and UF formed a coalition government that administered the country from 1964 to 1968.  During this time, Forbes Burnham would, according to Premdas, “proceed to erect, slowly initially, a thoroughgoing system of ethnic control in Guyana” (Premdas 1995, 115). The UF, necessary at first to ensure a majority in Parliament, became a millstone around the neck of the PNC in the view of Burnham (Burnham 1970, 153). D’Aguiar’s party represented the old privileged class, who were aligned to Western interests and who were intent on keeping their positions of superiority in the society. After a number of MP’s crossed over to the PNC, the UF was expelled from the coalition and the PNC gained full control of the government (Premdas 1995, 118).

Premdas describes how the PNC consolidated its power after the 1968 elections which “would be incontrovertibly established as rigged elections” (Premdas 1995, 118). The process entailed a radical reformation of the economic structure of the country, which had “favoured big businessmen, large property owners, and foreign companies” and which did not favor his party’s “communal supporters” (Premdas 1995, 119). Burnham’s socialism, in other words, was a consequence of his objective of seizing economic power from “communal supporters” who opposed him and bestowing it on his own supporters. Garner suggests a similar process, adding “militarization” to nationalization as the means of “enabling the PNC to extend it patronage network” (Garner 2008. 157). By 1970, Guyana was declared to be a “Co-operative Republic”. According to Premdas, “From private enterprise, the economy was to be founded on co-operatives as the main instrument of production, distribution, and consumption” (Premdas 1995, 120). Burnham maintained power through rigged elections and through manipulating the legal system to legitimize political authority. The majorities obtained through fraudulent means were used to change the constitution of Guyana. According to Garner:

Between 1968 and 1980, the distinction between the Guyanese state and the PNC was steadily eroded by a series of constitutional amendments, referenda and pieces of legislation. By 1985, the PNC had become the Guyanese state, as Burnham had declared in his 1974 ‘Declaration of Sophia’ that ‘the party should assume unapologetically its paramountcy over the Government which is merely one of its executive arms’. (Garner 2008, 157).

The economy, meanwhile, was undergoing profound changes. John Gafar gives a detailed account of the performance of the Guyanese economy in the period 1960 to 2001 in his book Guyana: From State Control to Free Markets. Suffice to say, while GDP and per-capita GDP rose from 1964 to 1976, after 1976 up to 1990 there was a catastrophic decline in GDP (from approximately G$24000M to about G$16000M) and per-capita GDP (from approximately G$35000 to G$19000) (Gafar2003, 38). Gafar writes that the state of crisis in the economy was due to “falling production, mounting arrears on foreign debt payments and widening trade deficits due largely to inappropriate domestic expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, and financial mismanagement” (Gafar 2003, 43). Ferguson states that “Guyana was in a virtual state of collapse by 1985” (Ferguson 1995, 32). This decline in economic performance had far-reaching political consequences because of its effect on PNC supporters.

While the PNC was facing this economic crisis, the Working Peoples Alliance (WPA), led by one of the Caribbean most illustrious intellectuals, Walter Rodney, organized demonstrations and strikes against the government among traditional supporters of the PNC. Premdas writes: “The PNC regime, especially since 1977, had become embattled. It was attacked by Rodney’s WPA and the other left-wing groups; threatened by the withdrawal of support from the  middle class professional group which managed the day to day operations of the government; and bewildered by the demonstrations and strikes mounted by its own supporters in its traditional strongholds …” (Premdas 1995, 131). In June 1980, Rodney was assassinated and Burnham resorted to increased repression to continue his hold on political power. Guyana descended into a reign of terror that was to end only with the death of Forbes Burnham in 1985 and the assumption of office by Desmond Hoyte, who, realizing that the repressive nature of Burnham’s rule had created an explosive social situation in Guyana, decided to initiate changes in the political and economic policies of the government. Melissa Ifill claimed that:

Desmond Hoyte’s accession to the president’s office after the death of Forbes Burnham in August 1985, gave rise to fundamental changes in the political and economic direction of the state by the early 1990s. The Hoyte administration quickly confirmed its desire to institute policy changes in the local economy despite opposition from some influential members within the PNC. Under Hoyte’s stewardship, several strategies and policies were adopted that conflicted with the co-operative socialist ideology that the PNC, under Burnham’s leadership, had espoused. (Ifill 2002).

In fact, the economic crisis was too profound to ignore. Aid was critical if the economy had any chance of being resuscitated. In 1985, Guyana had become the first country to be declared as being ineligible to have access to the resources of the IMF (Ferguson 1995, 55). International Financial Institutions, therefore, had to be assuaged. The relationship between the IMF/World Bank and Guyana had been a strained and erratic one, and it is this intervention of the IMF/World Bank into the Guyanese drama that played out in the 1980s to 1990s that will be looked at next.

Guyana: Ideological Opportunism

  1. Ideology, Pragmatism and Ethno-Opportunism

Ferguson has claimed that Jagan displayed an “essential ‘innocence’” that was responsible for much of his political problems with the United States and the United Kingdom, while Burnham “displayed a clear-headed grasp of the realpolitik of his environment” (Ferguson 1999, xi, xii). In this regard the conflict between political pragmatism and ideological purity needs to be examined. Certainly in the heady days of the 1960’s, when the Third World was aflame with independence and liberation movements, political idealism was not unusual. But the argument holds that Jagan was perhaps carried away by the revolutionary geist and rhetoric of the age.

Ferguson states:

The Burnham-Jagan nationalist coalition of forces in the early 1950’s for a brief moment galvanised the Guyanese people and inspired hope for a unity of purpose in nation-building. But this short-lived unity of the nationalist forces across class and race was irretrievably ruptured and has left in its wake the political debris – including recriminations, attribution of blame, deep personal enmities and the like – for a persisting and intractable alienation of the two major racial groups in Guyana. Stoking the embers of the emergent racial alienation at the time were exceedingly powerful external interests that unabashedly exploited this crucial political divergence in pursuit of their own geo-strategic imperatives, linked to the Cold War.

In this connection, Jagan and the PPP provided the two major and relevant Western powers of the period, the US and the UK, with a ready-made reason for their divisive interventionism. In the harsh Cold war context of the moment, the Soviet-oriented communist sympathies of the PPP’s top leadership were objectionable to them from their strategic vantage-point of the life-and-death struggle with the Soviet Union. This was the basic stuff of realpolitik, conceived as external policy and behaviour linked closely to power and national interests and divorced from considerations of morality and principle. Within the framework of the prevailing global ideological contestation for supremacy, the fate of Jagan and the PPP was effectively sealed. (Ferguson 1999, xi)

The question arises – when does pragmatism dissolve into opportunism? What are the limits of pragmatism and ideological purity? For small, militarily non-powerful, Caribbean states, the question is critical. The PNM’s post-1991 championing of the private sector as the engine of growth, Manley’s conversion to the doctrine of the private sector as the engine of growth, Jagan’s acceptance of the same doctrine, all of this points to the vulnerability of Caribbean states in the American Lake and the success of the “ideological offensive” of neo-liberalism (or neo-conservatism) in the post Cold War age. How is the limit of resistance to the curtailment of autonomy in the region to be gauged? For certainly Ferguson’s comments do not advocate a purely rubber-stamp role to Caribbean governments. They raise a critically important and legitimate issue, particularly in light of the fact that governments in the region, including Guyana, have embraced the doctrine of market led reforms anyhow. The PPP no longer advocates a Marxist state; its policies are avowedly market oriented.

If the question of pragmatism and ideological purity is one way of assessing the history of Guyana from the 1960’s, Ralph Premdas’ study introduces another perspective. For Premdas the history of Guyana since that split in the PPP produced two ethnically based parties, competing in a struggle to the death for dominance. The moment of reconciliation was irretrievable lost. According to Premdas:

The moment of opportunity to build a new basis for inter-group relations and a new society was lost forever it seemed, when the two sectional leaders parted company, formed their own parties and pursued their own ambitions for personal acclaim and power. The moment of reconciliation is a rare event in a multi-ethnic state suffused with all sorts of underlying predispositions for ethnically-inspired behaviour. What makes the loss of that opportune moment even more unbearable is the following sequence of events in which the old divisions embedded in the social structure were exploited and exacerbated by a new form of mass politics. A new type of party emerged, constructed on the discrete ethnic fragments into which the old unified party had been broken. (Premdas 1995, 45)

One may ask – what caused this moment of opportunity to be squandered? If the events leading up to the split in the PPP are analyzed, it is clear that pressure was brought to bear on the publicly proclaimed Marxist PPP by both the United States and the United Kingdom. As Ferguson writes – “The British had their clear strategic concerns in Guyana. Apart from safeguarding their colonial economic interests, a major concern, echoing that of the Americans, had to do with ensuring that Guyana was not ruled by a communist government, closely aligned with the hostile Soviet Union… the Guyana debacle of the early 1960’s was unfolding in the context of the Cold war at its height…” (Ferguson 1999, xii, xiii).

Maurice St. Pierre describes the events after the election of the PPP in 1953 (St. Pierre, 1999, 103-128). British troops were sent to British Guiana in October of 1953 to prevent “Communist subversion of the Government”. A number of PPP government ministers were detained. Tensions between PPP supporters and the colonial administration under Governor Savage escalated. (For a description of these events, see: St. Pierre 1999, 103-128; Jagan 1997, 123-146; Burnham 1970, xix) The constant pressure brought to bear on the PPP exacerbated the fault line between ‘moderates’ and ‘Marxists’.  Finally in February 1955 a motion of no-confidence in the executive was moved by the Burnham faction. It was clear that the British government was sending a message that Burnham was a more acceptable leader than Jagan, and that message was having an impact on Burnham and his supporters.

The motion of no-confidence led to a walk-out by the Jaganite faction. At this point a new executive was voted in and Burnham was chosen as leader of the party. The Jaganite faction reacted to this by expelling Burnham and some of his main followers – Jai Narine Singh, and Dr. J.B. Latchmansingh – and disciplining other supporters of Burnham (St. Pierre 1999, 135). Eventually the party split into two factions, one headed by Jagan, the other by Burnham. The pressure put on the party and on the society as a whole by the events following the elections of 1953 and the election of a publicly declared Marxist PPP government was the trigger that fractured the party and the society.

Premdas writes about “triggers” that precipitate ethnic conflict. He claims:

The factors that triggered ethnic conflict were clearly identifiable but occurred at different times during the evolution of the problem. These factors were: (1) colonial manipulation; (2) introduction of mass democratic politics; and (3) rivalry over resource allocation. It is necessary to cumulatively conceive of the problem in which these factors at different points served as precipitating ‘triggers’. At various times, a particular triggering factor deposited a layer of division which in turn provided the next step for the deposit of a new layer of forces to the accumulating crisis. (Premdas 1995, 185).

The pressure put on the government and the society after the 1953 elections by the colonial powers were indeed a form of “colonial manipulation” designed to prevent what these powers conceived to be a “communist subversion”. There is no doubt that the geo-politics of the era was the deciding factor in that intervention. As Ferguson says, “In the harsh Cold war context of the moment, the Soviet-oriented communist sympathies of the PPP’s top leadership were objectionable to them from their strategic vantage-point of the life-and-death struggle with the Soviet Union” (Ferguson, 1999, xi).

The issue becomes then – how do Caribbean governments draw that line between pragmatism and ideology? How do Caribbean governments represent the interests of the masses who elect them in the face of the possibly opposing interests of hegemonic powers? Again the construction of a political language, which allows maneuverability by governments in the region, seems vitally important. Certainly, without that common political language, the distinction between “pragmatism” and “opportunism” is a difficult one to make. Such a distinction can be made only by reference to the actual political outcome of the various political actors time in office, i.e. their deeds.